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I~ THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
F.RYIN G. RICHARDSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
\\'ARDEN JOHN W. TURNER, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 10164 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATE~IENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Ervin G. Richardson, appeals from the 
decision of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ray VanCott, Jr., 
Judge, denying the appellant's petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On April 13, 1964, the petitioner filed a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County. On April 14, 1964, the writ of habeas corpus was 
issued scheduling a hearing for the 27th day of April. On 
the 27th day of April, 1964, the respondent filed its answer 
and return to the writ of habeas corpus and a hearing was 
had upon the petition. On May 6, 1964, the Honorable Ray 
YanCott entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
judgment denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
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2 
Subsequently, on May 25, 1964, the appellant filed his 
notice of appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits the petition for writ of habeas 
corpus was properly denied by the trial court, and this court 
should affirm. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus 
alleging that he was convicted in the Third Judicial District 
Court of Tooele County, Utah and committed to the Utah 
State Penitentiary (R. 1). The sole basis upon which the 
petitioner sought relief from his confinement was upon an 
allegation that the crime which the appellant committed 
took place on property under the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the United States Government (R. 1). The respondent 
answered, denying the allegation that the court was with-
out jurisdiction. At the time of hearing, it was stipulated 
between the parties that the petitioner, Ervin G. Richard-
son, was convicted upon plea of guilty of the crime of taking 
indecent assault upon a child under the statutory age in vio-
lation of 76-7-9 of Utah Code Annotated 1953 (R. 15, 16). 
It was further stipulated that the physical contact constitut-
ing the assault occurred on Dugway Proving Grounds in 
Tooele, Utah. At the time of the commission of the crime, 
the appellant was living at 60A East Second Avenue, at the 
Dugway Proving Grounds in the southeast quarter section. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 was admitted into evidence, which was 
a copy of order of the Secretary of Interior dated October 
24, 1950, withdrawing certain portions of the public do-
main for use by the Army for military purposes. It was 
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further stipulated that the crime was committed on a por-
tion of the lands withdrawn for military purposes (R. 17). 
It was further stipulated that the State of Utah never had 
ownership of the lands but that proprietary ownership 
rested in the United States (R. 17). At the time the crime 
was committed, the lands were being used as a part of a 
military reservation (R. 18). 
There was no evidence before the court that the lands 
\Yere being used for a military reservation at the time of 
statehood, or that the State of Utah ever ceded legislative 
jurisdiction over the lands. Further, there was no evidence 
that the United States or any official of the United States 
ever accepted exclusive jurisdiction over the area where 
the crime was committed. The trial court expressly found 
that the area wherein the crime was committed "never had 
a legislative jurisdiction ceded from the State of Utah nor 
has the Governor or other officials of the State of Utah filed 
or executed any deed of cession for said area" (R. 8). Fur-
ther, the court found that the subject lands were dedicated 
to military uses by withdrawal from the public domain by 
the act of the Secretary of Interior and that at no time has 
the United States formally accepted exclusive jurisdiction 
from the State of Utah over the said area, nor has the State 
ever purported to transfer such jurisdiction (R. 9). 
Based upon the above facts, it is submitted that as a mat-
ter of law, the appellants have not shown that the crime 
was committed in an area where the United States exercises 
exclusive jurisdiction. 
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THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT 
THE DISTRICT COURT IN WHICH THE APPELLANT 
PLEAD GUILTY, WAS CONVICTED, AND COMMITTED, 
HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON AND SUBJECT 
MATTER AND THAT THE CRIME WAS NOT COMMITTED 
UPON A MILITARY RESERVATION OVER WHICH THE 
UNITED STATES EXERCISED EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION. 
The appellant's contention is that since the crime with 
which he was charged was committed upon a military reser-
vation that the state was without jurisdiction to prosecute, 
it being contended that the federal government had ac-
quired exclusive jurisdiction over the reservation. The rele-
vant facts in this regard show only that in 1950 the Secre-
tary of Interior withdrew from the public domain certain 
areas of land in Tooele County for the purposes of use by the 
Department of the Army. There is no evidence that prior 
to this withdrawal the subject lands (the lands upon which 
the crime was committed) were being used for military pur-
poses. The letter of the Secretary of Interior, effecting the 
withdrawal, recites that the lands are being withdrawn 
from "public appropriation." Consequently, prior to the 
withdrawal, the lands were part of the general public do-
main subject to appropriation and private acquisition by 
compliance with the various homestead and mining laws of 
the United States. No evidence appears of record that the 
subject lands were being used for military purposes at the 
time of statehood or that at the time of statehood the 
United States reserved jurisdiction over the lands in ques-
tion. Additionally, there is no evidence demonstrating, that 
the Legislature of the State of Utah ever consented to the 
acquisition of "legislative jurisdiction" over the subject 
lands or that the Governor of the State of Utah ever deeded 
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"legislative jurisdiction" by a deed of cession. The appel-
lant relies in part for its contention upon a statement con-
tained in Article III, paragraph 2 of the Constitution of 
the State of Utah disclaiming title to the unappropriated 
public lands in the State of Utah. Prior to determining the 
question of exclusive jurisdiction, it is well to note the dif-
ference between the power of the state to exercise its police 
authority, and the ownership and title to lands. The United 
States holds its lands primarily in a proprietary status. Fort 
Lcm'cnworth RR v. LoweJ 114 U.S. 525 ( 1885). However, 
this is an entirely different thing than the question of legis-
lative jurisdiction. It is essential that the United States 
have title to land before it may exercise jurisdiction there-
over on the basis of land ownership alone. Ex parte H ebardJ 
11 Fed. Cas. 1010, No. 6312 (C.C.D. Kan. 1877). How-
rver, mere title alone does not give exclusive jurisdiction. 
At the outset, it is important to ascertain the manner in 
which exclusive jurisdiction or even legislative jurisdiction 
of any kind may be obtained. The most comprehensive legal 
study in this area is A Report of the Interdepartmental 
Committee for the Study of jurisdiction over Federal Areas 
Within the States 195 7. The report was the result of the 
appointment of a committee by President Eisenhower 
under the Attorney General to study the problem of juris-
diction over federal areas within the states. Since the report 
is the most comprehensive legal treatise in the field, it will 
be cited in this brief in many instances. (It will be cited 
as Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas Within the States, Part 
II, 1957.) The Constitution of the United States, Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 17, is the only constitutional expression 
allowing the federal government to acquire exclusive juris-
diction over lands within state boundaries. This provision 
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grants to congress the power to exercise exclusive legisla-
tion over: 
"Such District as may become the Seat of the Gov-
ernment of the United States, and to exercise like Au-
thority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the 
Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, 
for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, Dock-
yards, and other needful Buildings." 
As can be seen, the constitutional provision grants only 
the power to exercise such exclusive jurisdiction over the 
District of Columbia and those places purchased with the 
consent of the Legislature of the state. In this instance there 
was no purchase of the lands upon which the crime was 
committed within the constitutional sense. See United 
States v. Cornell, 25 Fed. Cas. 646, No. 14867 (C.C.D. R.I. 
1819). As Mr. Justice Story noted in 2 Story, Constitution, 
Section 1224 ( 1847) acquisition pursuant to the constitu-
tional allowance "can only be exercised at the will of the 
state." Since it is as a matter of record that there was no 
consent by the State of Utah in the instant case to the acqui-
sition of legislative jurisdiction over the lands at Dugway 
Proving Grounds involved in this case, appellant cannot 
predicate exclusive jurisdiction on the constitutional pro-
vision. 
A second method by which jurisdiction may be obtained 
was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in 
Fort Leavenworth RR v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 ( 1885). In 
that case the Supreme Court held that the United States 
obtained exclusive jurisdiction over Fort Leavenworth mili-
tary reservation when the State of Kansas by legislative 
enactment ceded to the United States the exclusive juris-
diction over the reservation. In the instant case, there was 
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no cession of legislative jurisdiction over the subject lands 
by the legislature of the State of Utah within the construc-
tion of the Fort Leavenworth RR case. Although 63-8-1, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, provided a general grant al-
lowing the federal government to take legislative jurisdic-
tion over military reservations, the exercise of this grant is 
dependent upon the Governor executing appropriate con-
veyances ceding the jurisdiction, 63-8-2, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953. In the instant case, there has been no such con-
veyance. Further, even if it is assumed that the legislative 
grants in 63-8-1 operated as a cession on the part of the 
state, there has been no acceptance by the United States. 
R.S. 355, 54 Stat. 19, 33 U.S.C. 733, 40 U.S.C. 255, 50 
U.S.C. 175, enacted February 1, 1940, provided as follows: 
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
obtaining of exclusive jurisdiction in the United States 
over lands or interests therein which have been or shall 
hereafter be acquired by it shall not be required; but 
the head or other authorized officer of any department 
or independent establishment or agency of the Govern-
ment may, in such cases and at such times as he may 
deem desirable, accept or secure from the State in 
which any lands or interests therein under his immedi-
ate jurisdiction, custody, or control are situated, con-
sent to or cession of such jurisdiction, exclusive or par-
tial, not theretofore obtained, over any such lands or 
interests as he may deem desirable and indicate accept-
ance of such jurisdiction on behalf of the United States 
by filing a notice of such acceptance with the Governor 
of such State or in such manner as may be prescribed 
by the laws of the State where such lands are situated. 
U, nl~ss and until the United States has accepted juris-
dzctzon over lands, hereafter to be acquired as afore-
said, it shall be conclusively presumed that no such 
jurisdiction has been accepted." 
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This statute, which would have been applicable to any 
action involving the subject lands of this case, requires 
affirmative action by the federal government expressly con-
senting to the state's cession. In Adams v. United States, 
319 U.S. 312 ( 1943); People v. Brown, 69 Cal.App.2d 602, 
159 P.2d 686 ( 1945), the provisions of the act of February 
1, 1940 (40 U.S.C. 255) requirethattheheadoftheagency 
file notice of acceptance with the state. The agency involved 
to obtain jurisdiction in this instance, would have been the 
War Department and no such acceptance has been filed. 
Further, in Adams v. United States, supra, the United 
States Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Black, approved 
opinions of the Judge Advocate of the Army and the Solici-
tor of the Department of Agriculture that notice of accept-
ance must be filed if the government is to obtain concurrent 
(and necessarily exclusive) jurisdiction. This has not been 
done in the instant case. Exhibit 3 from the Secretary of 
Interior, who is not the authorized officer, is merely a notice 
of withdrawal and in no way attempts to consent to accept-
ance over jurisdiction. Consequently, the appellant cannot 
contend that there has been an appropriate acceptance. 
The appellant in his brief argues that the correspondence 
between the Secretary of Interior and Governor Maw 
should be deemed an acceptance. It is suffice to note that 
there is no evidence of record of any such correspondence 
and Governor Maw was not the Governor of the State of 
Utah at the time of the transfer of the lands involved in the 
instant case. 
The third method by which the federal government may 
acquire exclusive jurisdiction over an area within the state 
is apparently the method the appellant relies upon. This 
is by federal reservation. This concept was recognized in 
Fort Leavenworth RR v. Lowe, supra. However, the reser-
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vat ion must be a reservation at the time of statehood. Thus 
in Afilitary Reservations and Navigable Waters, Depart-
ment ofthe Army ( 1961), it is stated: 
"Congress has in several instances reserved jurisdic-
tion over specified areas in connection with the admis-
sion of a state into the Union. This method of preserv-
ing legislative jurisdiction in the federal government 
was also recognized by the Supreme Court in the case 
of Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe wherein the court 
stated by way of dicta: 
'Congress might undoubtedly upon such admis-
sion have stipulated for retention of the political 
authority, dominion and legislative power of the 
United States over the Reservation, so long as it 
should be used for military purposes by the govern-
ment; that is, it could have excepted the place from 
the jurisdiction of Kansas, as one needed for the 
uses of the general government.' 
"Where the enabling act admitting a state into the 
Union contains no provision retaining jurisdiction in 
the United States over a military reservation located 
in the state, federal jurisdiction over the reservation 
exists only if jurisdiction is ceded by the newly formed 
state." 
See also Rogers v. Squire, 157 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1946), 
cert. denied, 330 U.S. 840 ( 194 7) ; Olsen v. M cPortlin, 105 
F. Supp. 561 (D.C. :rvfinn. 1952). In this instance the evi-
dence shows the lands in question were not reserved for 
military purposes at the time of statehood, rather were only 
withdra\1\'11 from the public domain in 1950. Consequently, 
the appellant has no basis under the reservation theory 
either. 
The appellant seems to argue that if the lands were with-
dra\\n from the public domain for the uses of a fort, maga-
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zine or arsenal, etc. and if the lands had never been used 
by the State of Utah or title vested in the State of Utah, that 
the withdrawal for military uses automatically vests exclu-
sive jurisdiction in the United States. In jurisdiction Over 
Federal Areas Within the States, Part II. supra (1957), 
page 45, it is noted: 
"It scarcely needs to be said that unless there has 
been a transfer of jurisdiction ( 1) pursuant to clause 
17 by a Federal acquisition of land with State consent, 
or ( 2) by cession from the State to the Federal Gov-
ernment, or unless the Federal Government has re-
served jurisdiction upon the admission of the State, the 
Federal Government possesses no legislative jurisdic-
tion over any area within a State, such jurisdiction 
being for exercise entirely by the State, subject to non-
interference by the State with Federal functions, and 
subject to the free exercise by the Federal Government 
of rights with respect to the use, protection. and dis-
position of its property. 
"* * * The Federal Government cannot, by uni-
lateral action on its part, acquire legislative jurisdic-
tion over any area within the exterior boundaries of a 
Statt=>.* * *'' 
In Military Reservations and Navigable Waters, Depart-
ment of the Army ( 1961) page 29, the following is stated: 
"There are three methods by which the United 
States acquires jurisdiction over land located within 
one of the several states: consent to purchase, cession, 
and reservation." (Citing People v. Godfrey, 117 
Johns. R. 225, N.Y.1819.) 
See also AFM 110-3 Civil Law, Department of the Air 
Force ( 1959) page 50403. 
In Silas Mason Company v. The Tax Commission, 302 
lJ.S. 186 ( 1937) the United States Supreme Court noted 
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that the question of whether or not the state has yielded to 
the federal government exclusive legislative authority over 
lands acquired by the federal government is a federal ques-
tion. In that case, the United States Supreme Court noted: 
"* * * The acquisition of title by the United States 
is not sufficient to effect that exclusion. It must appear 
that the State, by consent or cession, has transferred 
to the United States that residuum of jurisdiction 
which otherwise it would be free to exercise.* * *" 
See also United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138 ( 1930); 
Anno. 74 L.Ed. 138. It is apparent, therefore, that the 
United States cannot obtain exclusive jurisdiction over 
lands merely by withdrawing them from the public domain 
and restricting public entry by committing them to military 
purposes. In Rothfels v. Southworth, 11 U.2d 169,356 P.2d 
612 (1960), this court noted that some parts of Dugway 
Proving Grounds are under exclusive jurisdiction of the 
United States and other parts are not. Loc. Cit., page 173. 
In the instant case, the evidence before the trial court and 
that now before this court on appeal conclusively demon-
strates that the actions necessary for the United States to 
obtain exclusive jurisdiction over the lands in question (and 
where the appellant committed the crime for which he is 
being held) have not been taken. The requirement for the 
United States to obtain exclusive jurisdiction involves the 
consent of the state; and with reference to acquisition under 
the constitutional powers of the United States it has been 
generally said that it "exclude[ s J from its operation places 
which had been part of the public domain and have been 
resen·ed from sale." jurisdiction Over Federal Areas With-
in the States, Part II ( 195 7) page 67. 
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A case demonstrating the unreasonableness of the appel-
lant's theory is that of Six Cos. Inc. v. DeVinney, 2 Fed. 
Supp. 693 (D.C. Nevada 1933). In that case, the plaintiff 
contended that the United States had obtained lands for a 
federal project by withdrawal from the public domain by 
the Secretary of Interior and that as a consequence, this 
vested exclusive jurisdiction in the United States thus di-
vesting the State of Nevada of its tax power. The court 
expressly ruled that a portion of the public domain could 
not be withdrawn for a governmental purpose and thereby 
divest the state of jurisdiction. The court ruled that the 
Secretary of Interior had no power to establish a reservation 
by withdrawing from the public domain federal lands and 
committing them to specific governmental usages. (Head-
note No.4) The court noted that an expression of opinion 
contained in letters between the Secretary of Interior and 
the Governor of the State of Nevada were not effective to 
result in exclusive jurisdiction. The court stated: 
"It is here appropriate to say that expressions of 
opinion contained in the letters passing between the 
Secretary of the Interior and the Governor are without 
force as affecting the validity or invalidity of the reser-
vation.***'' 
See also St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. v. Satterfield, 
27 F.2d 586 (8 Circ. 1928). In that case, the facts are sub-
"itantially similar to those in the instant case and the court 
held that the State of Oklahoma had not relinquished juris-
diction over Fort Reno so as to divest the state of its au-
thority to exercise police and taxing powers on the reserva-
tion. The appellant relies upon the case of the State v. 
Tully, 31 Mont. 365, 78 P. 360 ( 1904) for the proposition 
that committing federal lands to military use gives the fed-
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era! government exclusive jurisdiction. A reading of that 
case makes it manifest that it is inapplicable to the present 
situation. That case involved a situation where the Fort 
l\Iissoula Military Reservation was created prior to state-
hood and where the Montana Supreme Court determined 
that there was a reservation of the area involved in the case 
by the United States and that the Montana Constitution, at 
the time of statehood, expressly relinquished jurisdiction 
over the reservation. Simple reading of the case shows that 
it is manifestly opposite to the case now before the court. 
Subsequently, in United States v. Tully, 140 F. 899 (C.C.D. 
Mont. 1905), the federal court determined that the United 
States did not have exclusive jurisdiction over the Fort Mis-
soula Military Reservation. Since the question of exclusive 
jurisdiction is a federal question, another reason for not 
applying the Tully rule is apparent. 
In this case, it is clear that: 
1. The United States did not acquire exclusive juris-
diction over the subject lands whereon the crime 
was committed pursuant to Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 17 of the federal constitution since there 
was no purchase with the consent of the state. 
2. The United States did not acquire exclusive juris-
diction by virtue of cession from the State of Utah 
since the State of Utah did not cede jurisdiction, 
the governor did not issue deeds of cession nor did 
the federal government accept exclusive jurisdic-
tion. All that happened was a simple withdrawal 
of federal lands from the public domain. 
3. The United States did not acquire exclusive juris-
diction by reservation at the time of statehood. 
Since the means by which exclusive jurisdiction 
may be obtained have not been shown in the in-
stant case, it is apparent that appellant is properly 
being held pursuant to valid state process. 
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CONCLUSION 
The appellant has filed for a writ of habeas corpus attack-
ing the jurisdiction of the court before which he plead 
guilty and from which he received judgment. It is apparent 
that there was no basis in law or fact for the contention that 
the court was without jurisdiction. This court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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